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Focus Column
Litigation
By Daniel Lee Jacobson
The casebook method has long been the favored tool of learning
for law students. Students learn to analyze appellate cases, thus
learning how to read, write and think as a lawyer, while simultaneously
learning the rules of common law.
But little law-school time is spent on reading statutes. That
being so, attorneys sometimes are ill-equipped to interpret and employ
statutes in their practices. In order to interpret and employ statutes,
one must understand statutes; in order to understand statutes, one must
know the rules of statutory construction.
In fact, "it is ... important for our system of justice to
observe well-founded and established rules [of statutory construction],"
the court ruled in Finn v. Superior Court, 156 Cal.App.3d 268
(1984). This article addresses those rules.
Civil Code Section 22.2 states, "The common law of England, so
far as it is not repugnant to or inconsistent with the Constitution of
the United States, or the Constitution or laws of this State
[California], is the rule of decision in all the courts of this State."
The Legislature is empowered to abrogate the common law, so long as such
abrogation is not constitutionally offensive. People v. Hickman,
204 Cal. 470 (1928).
In California Teachers' Association v. Governing Board of
Hilmar Unified School District, 95 Cal.App.4th 183 (2002), the court
ruled that "[o]ur fundamental task in construing a statute is to
ascertain the intent of the lawmakers so as to effectuate the purpose of
the statute." This tenet of statutory construction is universally
accepted in the state. See also, for instance, People v. Casillas,
92 Cal.App.4th 171 (2001); Ford v. Norton, 89 Cal.App.4th 974
(2001); and People v. Barrajas, 62 Cal.App.4th 926 (1998).
In fact, "[i]t is a cardinal principle that the primary rule of
statutory construction to which every other rule must yield is that the
intention of the Legislature should be given effect." California
School Employees Association v. Jefferson Elementary School District,
45 Cal.App.3d 683 (1975).
Then the question is how to "ascertain the intent of the
lawmakers so as to effectuate the purpose of the statute." The answer is
well-settled. According to People v. Toney, 32 Cal.4th 228
(2004), citing Hassan v. Mercy American River Hospital, 31
Cal.4th 709 (2003); and People v. Jefferson 21 Cal.4th 86 (1999):
"We begin by examining the words [of the statute] themselves because the
statutory language is generally the most reliable indicator of
legislative intent."
Where possible, a court must employ the "plain meaning" rule
when examining the words of a statute. "Where the statute is clear, the
'plain meaning' rule applies," the court ruled in Berry v. State of
California, 2 Cal.App.4th 688 (1992). "The Legislature is presumed
to have meant what it said, and the plain meaning of the language
governs."
"[W]e look first to the words of the statute, giving the
language its usual, ordinary meaning," the court stated in People v.
Fulton, 109 Cal.App.4th 876 (2003), citing People v.
Birkett, 21 Cal.4th 226 (1999). And the court in Giles v. Horn,
100 Cal.App.4th 206 (2002), citing Lungren v. Deukmejian, 45
Cal.3d 727 (1988), found, "Under the so-called plain meaning rule,
courts seek to give the words employed by the Legislature their usual
and ordinary meaning."
A court finds the "plain" or "ordinary" meaning of the words in
a statute in the same place as would a grammar-school student - the
dictionary.
"In seeking to ascertain the ordinary sense of words, courts ...
regularly turn to general dictionaries." Scott v. Continental
Insurance 44 Cal.App.4th 24 (1996). The court in People v.
Whitlock, 113 Cal.App.4th 456 (2003), quoting Consumer Advocacy
Group Inc. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 104 Cal.App.4th 438 (2002), found
the same: "To ascertain the common meaning of a word, 'a court typically
looks to dictionaries.'"
However, "where a word of common usage has more than one
meaning, the one which will best attain the purposes of the statute
should be adopted, even though the ordinary meaning of the word is
thereby enlarged or restricted and especially to avoid absurdity or to
prevent injustice." Taylor v. Forte Hotels International, 235
Cal.App.3d 1119 (1991), quoting S.F. Bay etc. Com. v. Town of
Emeryville, 69 Cal.2d 533 (1968), which, in turn, quoted People
v. Asamoto, 131 Cal.App.2d 22 (1955).
Every reasonable effort should be made to give significance to
all of the words of a statute. "If possible," the court decided in
Moyer v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board, 10 Cal.3d 222 (1973),
"significance should be given to every word, phrase, sentence and part
of an act in pursuance of the legislative purpose ; a construction
making some words surplusage is to be avoided." The court in People
v. Isaia, 206 Cal.App.3d 1558 (1989), agreed that "[c]onstructions
which would make part of ... [a] statute surplusage should be avoided."
Statutory context is important, as is the context of the use of
a word within a statute. "A statute must be construed in the context of
the entire statutory [scheme] of which it is a part, in order to achieve
harmony among [its] parts," according to O'Brien v. Dudenhoeffer,
16 Cal.App.4th 327 (1993), citing Unzueta v. Ocean View School
District, 6 Cal.App.4th 1689 (1992). "This principle applies even
though the two provisions are in separate codes."
The words of a statute "must be construed in context, keeping in
mind the nature and obvious purpose of the statute where they appear.
Moreover, the various parts of a statutory enactment must be harmonized
by considering the particular clause or section in the context of the
statutory framework as a whole." Citizens of Lake Murray Area
Association v. City Council of San Diego, 129 Cal.App.3d 436 (1982),
citing Moyer.
A specific statute will prevail over a general one, according to
Medical Board of California v. Superior Court, 88 Cal.App.4th
1001 (2001).
"If the terms of the statute are unambiguous, we presume the
lawmakers meant what they said, and the plain meaning of the language
governs," the court said in In re Marriage of Romero, 99
Cal.App.4th 1436 (2002).
However, according to Halbert's Lumber Inc. v. Lucky Stores,
6 Cal.App.4th 1233 (1992), "if the meaning of the words [in a statute]
is not clear courts must take the second step and refer to the
legislative history" - and "[a]n exception to ... [the plain meaning
rule] is a situation in which to follow a statute's plain meaning would
result in absurd consequences which the Legislature did not intend."
People v. Fenton, 20 Cal.App.4th 965 (1993), citing Younger v.
Superior Court, 21 Cal.3d 102 (1978).
As further explained in City of Los Angeles v. Los Olivos
Mobile Homes Park, 213 Cal.App.3d 1427 (1989): "The literal meaning
[of a statute] may be disregarded ... to avoid absurd results or to give
effect to manifest purposes that, in light of the statute's legislative
history, appear from its provisions considered as a whole."
There have been times when courts have expressed misgivings with
absolute adherence to the plain meaning rule. In Mesa Forest Products
Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Insurance Co., 73 Cal.App.4th 324 (1999),
the 2nd District Court of Appeal quoted Bodell Construction Co. v.
Trustees of California State University, 62 Cal.App.4th 1508 (1998):
"[T]he 'plain meaning' rule does not prohibit a court from determining
whether the literal meaning of a statute comports with its purpose."
"If the terms of the statute provide no definitive answer," the
court continued in Mesa, "then courts may resort to extrinsic
sources, including the ostensible objects to be achieved and the
legislative history."
But most California courts consider going beyond the meaning of
the words in a statute to determine the meaning of that statute to be a
step that is not to be taken lightly.
Justice David G. Sills explained, "It is the language of the
statute itself that has successfully braved the legislative gauntlet. It
is that language which has been lobbied for, lobbied against, studied,
proposed, drafted, restudied, redrafted, voted on in committee, amended,
re-amended, analyzed, reanalyzed, voted on by two houses of the
Legislature, sent to a conference committee, and after perhaps more
lobbying, debate and analysis, finally signed 'into law' by the
Governor."
"The same care and scrutiny," Sill continued, "does not befall
the committee reports, caucus analyses, authors' statements, legislative
counsel digests and other documents which make up a statute's
'legislative history.'" Halbert's Lumber.
Sills went on to explain the last potential step in statutory
construction.
"The final step," he said, " - and one which we believe should
only be taken when the first two steps have failed to reveal clear
meaning - is to apply reason, practicality and common sense to the
language at hand. If possible, the words should be interpreted to make
them workable and reasonable." Halbert's Lumber.
These rules of construction constitute the structure by which
statutes are interpreted and then ultimately employed.
Daniel Lee Jacobson is an attorney at Veatch, Carlson, Grogan &
Nelson and a professor at Pacific West College of Law. |